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D. DHS SHOULD AMEND THE REGULATION TO IMPOSE A 




Carla1 is a young woman from Peru who has lived in the United 
States for about six years. When Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) assumed custody of her on March 27, 2008, 
she had a one-year-old son and was seven months pregnant with her 
second child. She was also engaged to a U.S. citizen. The couple 
wanted to get married, but could not work out the logistics because 
Carla was being held in immigration detention. 
Carla’s lawyer promptly filed a bond motion before the 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) petitioning for her release while her case 
was pending. The IJ refused to hear the motion; he claimed that he 
would not have jurisdiction over her case until the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”).2 
NTAs are the documents that formally put noncitizens in removal 
proceedings and state the charges against them.3 NTAs also serve as 
the basis for Immigration Court jurisdiction.4
Carla’s attorney called and faxed DHS several times a week 
requesting an NTA for his client. He explained that Carla was in a 
difficult position; she was seven months pregnant and had a toddler 
son to care for. Nevertheless, after one month, DHS had not 
responded or issued an NTA.  Carla missed her son’s first birthday 
 1. Name changed by the author. Many thanks to Jason A. Dzubow, Esq., of 
Mensah, Butler & Dzubow, PLLC for sharing Carla’s story with me. 
 2. See Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 (2008) 
(stating that the Immigration Court has no jurisdiction in the case without an NTA, 
except to consider a bond motion). 
 3. 8 U.S.C.S § 1229 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 4. See Interview with Brittney Nystrom, Legal Director, CAIR Coalition, 
(Apr. 29, 2008) (noting that there is a debate among IJs about whether they can 
assume jurisdiction over a bond motion without the NTA being filed with the 
immigration court).  In practice, even if the IJ accepts jurisdiction over the bond 
motion without the NTA, the noncitizen still faces a dilemma. Id. If DHS appeals 
the motion, the noncitizen remains in detention for the duration of the appeal and 
the result is the same; the noncitizen is held in detention for an extended period of 
time without an NTA. Id. 
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and she was still in jail. Frustrated, Carla’s lawyer contacted the 
Office of Inspector General (“OIG”). He also began copying a 
representative of the House Oversight Committee for ICE detainees 
on all his communications with DHS. For weeks he received no 
response to his queries. Finally, with no explanation, DHS issued an 
NTA and released Carla on May 16, 2008—almost two months after 
first taking her into custody. DHS told Carla then that she could live 
with her family while waiting for her Immigration Court hearing on 
February 5, 2009. Carla’s experience raises many questions. Why 
was she held for so long without receiving notice of the charges 
against her? Why was she not given access to judicial review of her 
detention? What is the legal framework in place that permitted these 
types of delays? 5
Under international law, a state cannot deprive individuals of 
personal liberty without meeting basic standards of due process.6 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 
requires the United States to guarantee that an arrested individual 
receive “prompt” notice of the charges against him or her7 and have 
the right to challenge the legality of the detention “without delay.”8 
The problem for Carla is that although she has a right to an NTA 
eventually, the law does not establish a timeframe within which DHS 
must issue one.9 The custody procedures regulation states only that 
 5. Aside from a report about a group of men detained just after the 9/11 
attacks, see infra note 82, there is no other readily available empirical data about 
the issue of delayed NTAs in immigration detention. As a result, one can only 
speculate about the extent of the problem. According to a local non-governmental 
organization, the CAIR Coalition that regularly visits immigration detention 
centers in Virginia the problem is pervasive. Interview with Brittney Nystrom, 
Legal Director, CAIR Coalition (Apr. 14, 2009) (on file with author). 
 6. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna 
Convention] (affirming the principle of Pacta sunt servanda, that “[e]very treaty in 
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith”). 
 7. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(2). 
 8. Id. art. 9(4). 
 9. See INS Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001) (noting 
that the U.S. Constitution does not mandate that DHS serve notice of charges on 
the detained noncitizen within twenty-four hours). But cf. County of Riverside v. 
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (holding that notice of charges within forty-
eight hours would usually, but not always, be constitutionally sufficient in a 
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DHS must decide within forty-eight hours of assuming custody 
whether it will issue an NTA.10 The regulation does not, however, 
specify when DHS must issue the NTA or serve it on the detained 
individual or the Immigration Court. Since the former Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (“INS”)11 amended the custody 
procedures regulation several days after the 9/11 attacks,12 scholars 
and advocates have advanced strong arguments that it violates both 
domestic and international standards of due process.13 In spite of the 
criminal law enforcement context). 
 10. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 11. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 441, §§ 441-478 (2002) 
(designating the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) to take over the 
functions of INS). In 2003, the DHS absorbed the INS’s former responsibilities 
into the Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) to handle enforcement activities and the Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“BCIS”) to process visa and citizenship 
applications. See Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart (Apr. 1, 
2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/DHS_OrgChart.pdf. This comment 
identifies INS when referring to actions taken before 2003 and DHS or ICE when 
referring actions taken from 2003 to present. 
 12. See INS Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. at 48,334; see also 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1357(a)(2) (2006) (granting immigration officers the power to arrest aliens 
without a warrant based on a “reasonable belief” that the alien is in the United 
States in violation of immigration laws). Most immigration arrests are 
“warrantless” because the INA does not require immigration enforcement officials 
to have a written warrant or probable cause before arresting and detaining a 
noncitizen. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PRESUMPTION OF GUILT: HUMAN 
RIGHTS ABUSES OF POST-SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES 47 (2002), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/us911/USA0802.pdf (asserting that much post-
9/11 immigration detention was arbitrary, including prolonged detention without 
charges and continued detention in spite of a release order or a final order of 
removal); Shirley Huey et al., Comment, Indefinite Detention Without Probable 
Cause: A Comment on INS Interim Rule 8 C.F.R. § 287.3, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 397, 398 (2001) (arguing that the regulation violates the Fourth 
Amendment both in criminal and immigration law enforcement contexts, results in 
indefinite detention without probable cause, and exceeds the power granted by the 
authorizing provision of the INA); Background Paper for the U.N. Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention Concerning the U.S. Detention of Arabs and South Asians 
Post-September 11, at 2 (Apr. 1, 2002) (unpublished Background Paper) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Background Paper] (contending that the custody 
procedures regulation violates principles of due process enshrined in international 
law); Cyrus D. Mehta, Letter to Immigration and Naturalization Service, Re: INS 
No. 2171-01 Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48334 (September 20 2001), 
Comm. on Immigration & Nationality Law, 57 THE RECORD 32, 33 (2002) 
(asserting that the regulation violates the INA implementing provision, the Patriot 
  
576 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:571 
 
harsh criticism, the custody procedures regulation remains in force 
today and influences the lives of the hundreds of thousands of 
people, like Carla, who pass through immigration detention each 
year.14
This Comment focuses on whether the custody procedures 
regulation accords with the basic principles of due process of Article 
9 of the ICCPR.15 Part I.A discusses the history of the ICCPR and 
relevant Article 9 jurisprudence. Part I.B provides an overview of 
custody procedures in immigration detention. Part II argues that the 
regulation governing custody procedures is inconsistent with due 
process standards set forth in Article 9 of the ICCPR. Part III 
recommends several actions that the DHS and Congress should take 
to bring the custody procedures regulation into conformity with 
Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS AND THE UNITED STATES 
On December 10, 1948, the United Nations drafted the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which codified the minimum 
standards for the protection of human rights in the world.16 Soon 
thereafter, the Human Rights Commission composed two binding 
treaties to memorialize the non-binding principles of the Universal 
Act’s requirement that the government charge a certified terrorist within seven 
days, and possibly the Constitution). 
 14. See generally Memorandum from Asa Hutchinson, Border and 
Transportation Secretary, on Guidance on ICE Implementation of Policy and 
Practice Changes Recommended by the Department of Justice Inspector General to 
Michael J. Garcia, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, and Robert Bonner, 
U.S. Customs & Border Prot. (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.imm 
igrationforum.org/documents/TheDebate/DueProcessPost911/ICEGuidance.pdf 
[hereinafter Hutchinson Memorandum]. 
 15. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9. 
 16. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 12, 1948); see also MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY at XX (2d ed. 2005) (observing that the 
Universal Declaration gave real meaning to the term “human rights” in the U.N. 
Charter). 
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Declaration.17 The first, the ICCPR, embodied the more “classic” 
civil and political rights, such as the rights to life, a fair trial, and an 
effective remedy.18 The ICCPR protects these rights for “all 
members of the human family,”19 regardless of their immigration 
status.20
The United States became a party to the ICCPR in 1992.21 Upon 
ratification, however, the U.S. Senate issued “Reservations, 
Understandings and Declarations” that limited and modified the 
application of certain provisions of the treaty.22 The Senate also 
determined that the ICCPR is not self-executing and creates no 
private cause of action in U.S. courts.23 In spite of its non-self-
 17. See SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 8 (2d ed. 2004) (detailing that the General Assembly adopted 
the ICCPR in 1966 and, after garnering 35 ratifications, the Covenant came into 
force in 1976). 
 18. See NOWAK, supra note 16, at XIX-XX (discussing the relationship 
between the ICCPR and the traditional rights protected by the constitutional law 
that grew out of national revolutions in the West during the 18th and 19th 
centuries). The second treaty, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, protected other social liberties. See generally International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. 
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (protecting, for example, the principle of self-
determination, non-discrimination, right to work in safe and healthy conditions, 
and the right to unionize). 
 19. ICCPR, supra note 6, pmbl. (stating that the ideals of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights “can only be achieved if conditions are created 
whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights”). 
 20. See NOWAK, supra note 16, at XXV (explaining that the ICCPR protects 
human rights in three respects: (1) unlike basic constitutional rights in domestic 
law, international law gave rise to the rights protected by the Covenant; (2) except 
Article 25,  the rights apply to all persons; and, (3) except Article 1, the remaining 
articles give rights to individuals). 
 21. See S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Rep. on the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. 102, sec. IV (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 
645, 649 (1992) [hereinafter Senate Report] (recognizing that the rights guaranteed 
by the Covenant are “cornerstones of a democratic society”). 
 22. See id. at 651 (expressing reservations to the ICCPR involving, in part, the 
right to free speech, capital punishment, the meaning of “cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment or punishment,” and the treatment of juveniles as adults for 
criminal law enforcement purposes); William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the United States Still 
a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 316-17 (1995) (analyzing the repercussions of 
the Committee finding that the U.S. reservations to Article 6 and Article 7 of the 
ICCPR are illegal and invalid under international law). 
 23. See Senate Report, supra note 21, at 652 (declaring the ICCPR to be non-
  
578 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:571 
 
executing status, the ICCPR is a binding treaty obligation24 and 
requires the United States to adopt measures to protect the rights it 
enumerates.25 Article 2 is the “umbrella provision” that requires State 
parties to provide a remedy for the violation of any of the rights 
guaranteed by the ICCPR.26
Although the State parties are the primary guarantors of the rights 
enumerated in the ICCPR,27 the Human Rights Committee28 
(“Committee”) also monitors compliance through review of country 
reports, country visits, and the adjudication of individual claims.29 
The decisions of the Committee are not binding on State parties, but 
qualify as highly persuasive authority.30 The United States does not 
recognize the competence of the Committee to accept individual 
complaints.31 It does, however, submit yearly reports to the 
self-executing, which means that without separate implementing legislation it does 
not create a private cause of action in the U.S. courts); cf. John Shattuck, Works in 
Progress: Human Rights and Domestic Law After the Cold War, 9 EMORY INT’L L. 
REV. 377, 384-85 (1995) (noting that non-executing status “does not prevent U.S. 
courts from interpreting and taking guidance from the Covenant”). 
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“All treaties made . . . under the authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges, in every 
State, shall be bound thereby; any thing in the constitution or laws of any State to 
the contrary notwithstanding”) (emphasis added). 
 25. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 2. A state party violates Article 2 in three 
instances: (1) when it discriminates against an individual exercising a right;  
(2) when it fails to enact laws to guarantee the rights protected by the ICCPR; or, 
(3) when it does not offer adequate remedies for rights violations. See id. 
 26. See NOWAK, supra note 16, at 34 (commenting that Article 2 alone imposes 
duties on States, but does not establish independent rights); see also Lubicon Lake 
Band v. Canada, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 167/1984, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 
(A/45/40) (1990) (finding that the State could rectify a violation of Article 27 by 
providing the victim with a remedy sufficient to satisfy Article 2). 
 27. See ICCPR, supra note 6, pmbl., art. 2 (concluding that both individuals 
and states are responsible for promoting and respecting the rights embodied in the 
ICCPR). 
 28. See JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 17, at 16 (stating that the Human Rights 
Committee is a panel of eighteen human rights experts who act in their individual 
capacity). 
 29. See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter Optional Protocol] 
(requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies for individual complainants). 
 30. Cf. JOSEPH ET AL., supra note 17, at 17 (affirming that the Committee 
strives to make all decisions unanimously because majority decisions carry less 
weight). 
 31. See Optional Protocol, supra note 29, arts. 1-2 (granting jurisdiction to the 
Human Rights Committee over claims of violations of the ICCPR only by 
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Committee as mandated by Article 40 of the ICCPR.32 The decisions 
of the Committee are therefore relevant to the interpretation and 
application of the ICCPR in the United States. 
The Committee is not the only international body that contributes 
to ICCPR jurisprudence. In 1991, the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights created the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (“Working 
Group”) to investigate cases of arbitrary detention in violation of 
international human rights instruments.33 The Working Group’s 
mandate is broad and encompasses both criminal and administrative 
detention.34 Since its jurisdiction is not treaty-based like the
individuals from ratifying States). 
 32. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 40 (requiring States parties to submit reports 
“on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized . . .” 
by the ICCPR and the progress made in the promotion of the rights). The United 
States sporadically submits reports to the Committee. See, e.g., UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, SECOND AND THIRD PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA TO THE UN TO THE UN COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNING 
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, intro. (Oct. 21, 
2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/55504.htm (acknowledging that 
the United States and the Committee disagree about the scope and importance of 
certain provisions of the ICCPR). Nonetheless, non-governmental organizations 
criticize the United States for not candidly reporting to the Human Rights 
Commission the abuses and shortcomings under the ICCPR. See AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION, DIMMING THE BEACON OF FREEDOM: U.S. VIOLATIONS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 18 (June 2006), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/iccprreport20060620.pdf (noting that the 
U.S. report fails to mention many violations). 
 33. See Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Fact Sheet No. 26, (Off. of the 
High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Geneva, Switz.), sec. I, http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
html/menu6/2/fs26.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Working Group 
Fact Sheet] (describing the United Nations system of appointing a “Special 
Rapporteur” or a “Working Group” to investigate a specific theme or situation). 
 34. See U.N. ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Body of Principles for the Protection of 
All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment regarding the situation 
of immigrants and asylum seekers, intro., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/4/Annex 2 (Dec. 
28, 1999) (recognizing that the Working Group’s mandate covers the 
administrative detention of immigrants and asylum seekers); see also ECOSOC, 
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report, Civil and 
Political Rights, Including the Question of Torture and Detention, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2005/6 (Dec. 1, 2004) (expressing disapproval of the growing trend to hold 
noncitizens in immigration detention and the tendency to equate “terrorism and 
aliens”). 
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Committee,35 the Working Group accepts individual complaints 
against the United States.36
1. The Prohibition Against Arbitrary Detention of Article 9(1) 
Although Western civilizations have valued personal liberty as a 
human right for centuries,37 the right of personal liberty has never 
been absolute.38 Instead, it obligates states to provide procedural 
protections for individuals during arrests and detentions.39 Therefore, 
Article 9(1) of the ICCPR does not aim to prohibit all deprivations of 
personal liberty by the State, just those that are arbitrary and 
unlawful.40
The meaning of the word “arbitrary” is somewhat vague.41 In the 
context of Article 9(1), it encompasses not just unlawful detentions, 
but also all those that are unjust, unpredictable, unreasonable, 
capricious, and disproportional.42 For example, a lawful and non-
arbitrary detention may become arbitrary after the passage of a 
certain amount of time, if the detention continues without 
 35. See Working Group Fact Sheet, supra note 33, sec. III (requiring that the 
Working Group submit yearly reports to the Human Rights Commission). 
 36. See id. secs. III, V (specifying that the exhaustion of local remedies is not 
required and that the Working Group may consider cases on its own initiative);  
see also Ahmed Ali v. United States of America, Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/7/Add.1 (May 27, 2005) (finding the 
detention by the United States of an asylum seeker pending legal appeals to be 
arbitrary when the government failed to consider substantial evidence that he was 
neither a flight risk nor a danger to society). 
 37. See NOWAK, supra note 16, at 211 (citing the Magna Carta Libertatum in 
1215 as an example of one of the many instances in which society values 
individual liberty as a basic human right). Personal liberty is narrow; it deals with 
the “freedom of bodily movement in the narrowest sense.” Id. at 212. 
 38. See id. at 211 (explaining that States often validly use deprivation of liberty 
to fight crime and maintain security). 
 39. See id. at 211-12 (contrasting the human right of personal liberty as a 
procedural guarantee with the prohibitions of slavery and torture which strive 
towards absolute abolition). 
 40. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(1). 
 41. See NOWAK, supra note 16, at 218 (citing Human Rights Committee draft 
of Article 9, which was approved, without change, with seventy votes in favor). 
The United Kingdom abstained because of objections to the imprecision of the 
word “arbitrary.” Id. 
 42. See id. at 224-25 (asserting that an examination of the historical 
background indicates that the prohibition against arbitrary detention is broad). 
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justification.”43 Also, although Article 9 does not specifically require 
a written arrest warrant, lack of a warrant may provide evidence of 
arbitrariness.44
Article 9(1)’s prohibition of arbitrary detention applies to all 
deprivations of liberty, regardless of the label.45 Thus, according to 
the Committee, an apparently lawful arrest may be arbitrary if it 
violates other due process provisions of the ICCPR.46 Similarly, the 
Working Group sets out three categories of arbitrary detention and a 
Category III violation arises from either a complete or partial failure 
of the State to observe international due process norms, such as 
Article 9(2) and Article 9(4) of the ICCPR.47
2. The “Promptly Inform” Notice Standard of Article 9(2) 
Article 9(2) requires the State party to inform an individual, at the 
time of arrest, of the reasons for the arrest and to promptly inform the 
arrested individual of the charges against him or her.48 The 
notification of charges must be specific so that the arrested individual 
may act immediately to challenge the detention and petition for 
release if the charges are unfounded.49
 43. See A. v. Australia, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 560/1993, ¶¶ 9.3-9.4, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 30, 1997) (declaring the over four year 
detention of an asylum seeker arbitrary). 
 44. See NOWAK, supra note 16, at 229 (specifying that a clear majority of the 
Committee defeated Liberia’s motion to require a written arrest warrant in the 
ICCPR). 
 45. See id. at 225-26 (clarifying that the detention of noncitizens in relation to 
asylum and deportation is not per se arbitrary, but may be arbitrary depending on 
the particular circumstances). 
 46. See, e.g., Hugo van Alphen v. The Netherlands, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 
305/1988, ¶ 5.8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (Aug. 15, 1990) (finding 
detention arbitrary even though Dutch authorities detained van Alphen pursuant to 
pre-trial detention rules in the Netherlands and that arbitrariness is not the same as 
“against the law”). 
 47. See Working Group Fact Sheet, supra note 33, sec. IV pt. B (observing that 
international human rights instruments do not clarify the definition of arbitrary 
detention but stating that the Working Group will not simply declare a deprivation 
of liberty “unfair”). 
 48. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(2). 
 49. See Adolfo Drescher Caldas v. Uruguay, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 43/1979,  
¶ 13.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/19/D/43/1979 (1983) (finding a violation of Article 
9(2) of the ICCPR when the Navy officials informed Drescher Caldas that they 
were detaining him pursuant to “prompt security measures” without giving a 
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Unlike Article 9(1), it is unclear whether Article 9(2) applies only 
to criminal arrests and detentions or to all deprivations of liberty by 
the state.50 The Committee has held that the second clause requiring 
prompt notice of charges applies only in the criminal context.51 The 
Working Group, however, indicates that the “prompt notice” of 
charges requirement applies both to criminal and administrative 
detention.52
3. The Right to Judicial Review “Without Delay” of Article 9(4) 
Article 9(4) of the ICCPR gives an individual deprived of his or 
her liberty the right to “take proceedings before a court, in order that 
that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his 
detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.”53 The 
Committee has not established a bright-line rule, but generally finds 
that any detention longer than forty-eight hours, without access to 
judicial or other review, violates Article 9(4).54 Unlike Article 9(2), 
specific explanation of the charges against him). In the context of the ICCPR, 
promptly generally means “as soon as the charge is first made by a competent 
authority.” See ECOSOC, Human Rts. Comm., CCPR Gen. Comment 13, 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, (1994) 
(describing the definition of promptly within the context of notice of charges 
pursuant to Article 14(3) of the ICCPR); see also GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Hum. Rts. 
Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee, ¶ 79(12), U.N. Doc. A/56/40 
(2001) [hereinafter Uzbekistan Report] (finding that detention for seventy-two 
hours before notice of charges violated Article 9(2) of the ICCPR in the criminal 
context). 
 50. See NOWAK, supra note 16, at 228 n.105 (noting that part of 9(2) and all of 
9(3) only apply to persons against whom the state brings criminal charges). 
 51. See PIETER BOELES, FAIR IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS IN EUROPE 117 
(1997). The first clause requiring the State to inform the individual of the reasons 
for arrest applies to all deprivations of liberty, regardless of label. Id. Article 9(2) 
of the ICCPR requires that officials inform the individual of the reasons for arrest 
and promptly notify him of the charges thereafter, without mentioning the word 
criminal, while Article 9(3) requires States to bring those arrested on criminal 
charges before a judicial officer and ensure a trial within a reasonable time). See 
ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(2)-(3). 
 52. See ECOSOC, Hum. Rts. Comm., Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention 
or Imprisonment, annex 1, princs. A(3), (A)(15), U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1992/20 (1992) 
[hereinafter Working Group Principles] (voicing concern about “[c]ases in which a 
person suffers administrative detention for an obviously abusive period of time”). 
 53. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 9(4). 
 54. See Uzbekistan Report, supra note 49, ¶ 82(12) (finding that three days and 
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the requirement of Article 9(4) is likened to the right to habeas 
corpus and applies to all deprivations of liberty, including both 
criminal and administrative detention.55  
B. CUSTODY PROCEDURES IN IMMIGRATION DETENTION 
While noncitizens are entitled to certain due process protections, 
the government retains wide authority to detain them during 
immigration proceedings.56 In the past decade, the government has 
drastically expanded detention and removal operations, exercising 
this power of administrative detention more than ever before.57
fifteen hours before a judicial review does not satisfy the “prompt” requirement of 
the ICCPR in the criminal context); GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Hum. Rts. Comm., 
Report of the Human Rights Committee, ¶¶ 100-11, U.N. Doc. A/52/40 (1997) 
[hereinafter Switzerland Report] (finding a ninety-six hour requirement for judicial 
review of administrative immigration detention “excessive” and “discriminatory,” 
especially since the penal system mandates review within periods of either twenty-
four or forty-eight hours). 
 55. See GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, ¶ 84(11), U.N. Doc. A/57/40 (2002) [hereinafter Moldova Report] 
(noting that pursuant to article 9(4) of the ICCPR those in administrative detention 
have the right to initiate proceedings to challenge their detention). 
 56. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (stating that 
detention is valid as long as it is used as a means to “give effect to the provisions 
for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens”). 
 57. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Executive 
Summary of ICE Accomplishments in Fiscal Year 2006, May 15, 2007, 
http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/2006accomplishments.htm (reporting the 
creation of three times the number of fugitive operations teams to locate and 
apprehend noncitizens and a 6,300 increase for funded beds in immigration 
detention, bringing the total to 27,500). The rapid expansion is due to many 
factors, including provisions of laws passed in 1996 requiring mandatory detention 
of certain categories of noncitizens. See generally MARK DOW, AMERICAN GULAG: 
INSIDE U.S. IMMIGRATION PRISONS 9 (2004) (noting that from 1994 to 2001 the 
average number of immigration detainees tripled largely due to the passage of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) in 1996); 
MICHAEL WELCH, DETAINED: IMMIGRATION LAWS AND THE EXPANDING I.N.S. 
JAIL COMPLEX 2 (2002) (discussing the consequences of the power that the 1996 
laws conferred to INS to detain and deport noncitizens who had been convicted of 
drug and other offenses); David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on 
Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1030 (2002) (discussing extended 
detention of noncitizens pending ICE appeal of a decision to release to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals); Lee Hall, Nomads Under the Tent of Blue: Migrants 
Fuel the U.S. Prison Industry, 6 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 265, 303-16 (2004) 
(suggesting a connection between post-9/11 detention policies and commercial 
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Immigration custody procedures are complex.58 In practice, there 
are a variety of ways that DHS may take an individual into custody. 
For instance, immigration officials may arrest an individual without a 
warrant59 based on a “reasonable suspicion” or “belief” that the 
individual is in the country in violation of civil immigration laws.60  
DHS may also take custody over an individual who is already in jail 
after he or she has completed his or her criminal sentence.61 Also, 
local governments can make an agreement with DHS allowing local 
law enforcement officials to make immigration arrests.62
After assuming custody of the individual, DHS then determines 
whether it will issue an NTA, which is the charging document that 
places the individual in formal removal proceedings.63 The five basic 
profits for state and private detention facilities). 
 58. See Shoba Sivaprasad Whadia, Under Arrest: Immigrants’ Rights and the 
Rule of Law, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 853, 876 (2008) (commenting on the lack of data 
showing monetary or policy benefits from immigration detention). 
 59. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c) (2008) (granting the power to conduct warrantless 
arrests to all employees authorized by Agency regulations). 
 60. See id. § 287.8(b)(2), (c)(2)(ii) (obliging the arresting officer to have a 
reason to believe that the noncitizen is likely to escape before the officer can obtain 
an arrest warrant). 
 61. See id. § 287.7 (providing that any authorized immigration officer may 
inform any law enforcement agency that DHS seeks custody of a noncitizen to 
arrest and remove him or her). A “detainer” then allows the jail to temporarily 
maintain a noncitizen in custody for forty-eight hours before DHS assumes 
custody. Id. § 287.7(d). DHS assumes custody by issuing a Form I-200, Warrant of 
Arrest. See id. § 236.1 (noting that a respondent may be taken into custody 
pursuant to an arrest warrant when DHS issues the NTA or anytime thereafter). 
The regulation does not reference detention pursuant to a Form I-200, Warrant of 
Arrest, before the issuance of the NTA or the placement of the individual in 
removal proceedings. Interview with Brittney Nystrom, supra note 2 (noting two 
separate problems in Virginia jails, one in which an individual falls to an 
immigration detainer, DHS fails to assume custody, and the jail refuses to release 
him or her; the second, and more relevant to the issue addressed by this comment, 
is a situation in which a person falls to an immigration detainer, DHS assumes 
custody within forty-eight hours by issuing a Form I-200, but fails to issue an NTA 
to formally place the individual in removal proceedings). 
 62. Immigration and Nationality Act 287(g), 8 U.S.C. 1357(g) (LexisNexis 
2008);  see also U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Section 
287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, Aug. 16, 2006, http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/pi/news/factsheets/060816dc287gfactsheet.pdf. 
 63. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (LexisNexis 2008) 
(requiring service of the NTA on the noncitizen). The NTA must include 
information about: (1) the specific nature of the charges against the alien; (2) the 
alien may obtain counsel to represent him in the removal proceedings, or may 
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post-arrest steps include: (1) DHS’s determination to keep the 
individual in custody;64 (2) DHS’s determination to charge the 
individual with a ground of inadmissibility or deportability;65 (3) the 
issuance of the NTA;66 (4) service of the NTA on the individual in 
custody;67 and, (5) service of the NTA on the Immigration Court.68
DHS has revised the regulation delineating these custody 
procedures only once—just nine days after 9/11.69 After the attacks, 
Congress passed many laws in the name of protecting national 
security.70 Like much of the post-9/11 congressional legislation, the 
request time to secure counsel; and other requirements. See id. The sequence of 
events is slightly different in the case of a noncitizen that DHS transfers from 
criminal to immigration custody. See discussion supra note 60. 
 64. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(c)-(d) (2008) (providing that unless the noncitizen is 
subject to expedited removal, the examining officer must tell the alien of the 
reasons for his or her arrest). Certain classes of noncitizens are subject to 
mandatory detention, including noncitizens that are inadmissible on crime or 
terrorism related grounds. See generally Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due Process: 
The Need for Procedural Reform in “Joseph” Hearings After Denmore v. Kim, 31 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51, 53 (2006) (criticizing the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court’s decision upholding mandatory detention). 
 65. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (noting that the officer makes neither a custody nor 
a charging determination if he grants voluntary departure to the noncitizen). 
 66. See Interview with Brittney Nystrom, supra note 2 (explaining that in 
Virginia-area jails DHS will often make the custody determination, in effect 
determining that it will issue the NTA, but not actually issue the NTA until a later 
date). 
 67. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (LexisNexis 2008) (mandating that DHS give a written 
NTA to the noncitizen, but if personal service is not “practicable,” service by mail 
is sufficient). 
 68. See Letter from Local and National Advocacy Groups to Asa Hutchinson, 
U.S. Dept. Of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://www.imm 
igrationforum.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=657 [hereinafter Letter Concerning 
Guidance on ICE Implementation] (criticizing that neither the INA nor the custody 
procedures regulation require ICE to serve the NTA on the immigration court 
within a specific period of time). 
 69. See INS Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001) 
(requiring the immediate implementation of the rule as an interim rule without 
public comment based on the foreign affairs exception to the Administrative 
Procedure Act). As an administrative agency, the INS had the power to issue its 
own regulations, subject to the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
See generally JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 4 
(4th ed. 2006) (commenting on the notice and comment rulemaking process of the 
Federal Administrative Procedure Act). 
 70. See, e.g., Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, Pub. L. 
No. 107-173, § 302-03, 501, 116 Stat. 543 (2002) (creating a system for entry-exit 
control and monitoring of foreign students); Homeland Security Act of 2002 
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amended DHS custody procedures regulation aimed to promote 
cooperation between law enforcement and immigration enforcement 
agencies in terrorism investigations.71 To this end, the unilateral 
amendment extended the time period within which DHS must make 
a charging determination and created an open-ended exception in the 
case of an “emergency or extraordinary circumstance.”72 The 
following sections examine the standards set by the custody 
procedures regulation, the manner in which the government applied 
the regulation post-9/11, and finally, policy guidance enacted in 
response to its shortcomings. 
1. The “Forty-Eight-Hour” Standard 
The pre-9/11 custody procedures regulation required the former 
INS to determine within twenty-four hours of arrest whether to retain 
custody over the individual.73 The regulation now requires that DHS 
(HSA), Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 442, 451, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) (creating the 
Department of Homeland Security to centralize a range of functions, including 
information analysis, transportation security, and immigration enforcement); 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001) (expanding terrorism inadmissibility provisions and giving immigration 
officials access to the criminal database of the Federal Bureau of Investigation); 
see also Cong. Research Serv., Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 107th 
Congress, ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS 1 (2002), available at 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-3156:1 (observing a 
strong emphasis on “security” and “counter-terrorism” in congressional 
immigration legislation after 9/11). 
 71. Cf. Lawrence M. Lebowitz & Ira L. Podheiser, A Summary of the Changes 
in Immigration Policies and Practices After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 
2001: The USA Patriot Act and Other Measures, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 873, 873 
(2002) (making a case for stronger cooperation by noting that some of those who 
committed the attacks were foreign nationals who had entered illegally or 
overstayed visas); Teresa Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration 
and Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 85 (2005) 
(arguing that in response to terrorism the nation used immigration law to assist 
with crime control, capitalizing on prior laws that enhanced the collateral civil 
consequences for noncitizens convicted of crimes). 
 72. See INS Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. at 48,334 (averring that that the 
delays associated with the regular notice and comment period would prove 
“impracticable, unnecessary and contrary to the public interest”). 
 73. See INS Miscellaneous Amendments, 32 Fed. Reg. 6260, 6260 (Apr. 21, 
1967) (requiring INS to determine within twenty-four hours of arrest whether it 
had enough evidence to issue an arrest warrant and charge the individual with an 
immigration violation). 
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make the determination within forty-eight hours of the arrest.74 In 
spite of the longevity of the twenty-four-hour rule,75 the former INS 
claimed and DHS now maintains that it needs the full forty-eight 
hours to conduct additional criminal and immigration background 
checks in light of the 9/11 attacks.76
2. The “Extraordinary Circumstances” Exception 
The pre-9/11 custody procedures regulation did not permit any 
exceptions to the twenty-four-hour rule for custody determinations.77 
The amended regulation, however, allows for the exception that, “in 
the event of an emergency or other extraordinary circumstance,” 
DHS may make a custody determination within a “reasonable 
time.”78 Critics maintain that the exception allowed INS to detain an 
individual indefinitely without bringing charges or affording him the 
opportunity to challenge the legality of the detention.79
3. The 9/11 Detainees 
Many have questioned the legality of the amended custody 
procedures regulation.80 In particular, critics have expressed concern 
 74. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2008). 
 75. See Huey et al., supra note 13, at 400 (asserting that the “longstanding and 
consistent” use of a twenty-four hour deadline for over thirty years contradicted the 
sudden assertion that the additional delays were “necessary”). 
 76. See Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. at 48,334 (explaining that the INS 
might need the additional time to consult international databases and liaise with 
law enforcement agencies at home and overseas). 
 77. See Huey et al., supra note 13, at 412 (arguing that given the large 
caseloads of immigration officers, the lack of exceptions deterred officers from 
surpassing the twenty-four-hour deadline). 
 78. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d). 
 79. See Huey et al., supra note 13, at 398 (suggesting that the new rule creates 
a policy of arresting thousands of innocent people and spreading fear in immigrant 
communities). 
 80. See, e.g., Huey et al., supra note 13, at 398-413 (arguing that the custody 
procedures regulation contradicted the authorizing statute and the USA Patriot Act, 
violated the Fourth Amendment, and conflated civil and criminal arrests without 
providing the proper constitutional guarantees); Background Paper, supra note 13, 
at 21 (suggesting that post-9/11 practices were not in compliance with international 
law requiring prompt notice of charges and judicial review without delay); Mehta, 
supra note 13, at 33 (urging INS not to adopt the 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) interim rule 
as a final rule because it violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, the USA 
Patriot Act, and “undermine[d] [an] essential constitutional balance”). 
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that the government has taken advantage of the regulation to hold 
suspected terrorists in administrative immigration detention for the 
purpose of gathering evidence for criminal law enforcement 
purposes.81 Indeed, in the months following 9/11, the U.S. 
government arrested and held approximately 762 Arab and South 
Asian men (“9/11 detainees”) in administrative immigration 
detention for minor immigration violations.82
Prompted by widespread criticism and several lawsuits pertaining 
to their treatment,83 the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Office of the 
Inspector General conducted a review and published a 
comprehensive report about the experience of the 9/11 detainees 
(“OIG Report”).84 The OIG Report acknowledges that after 9/11 the 
government was facing an emergency situation that presented 
legitimate law enforcement concerns. The OIG Report, however, 
also identifies systemic problems with the application of the custody 
procedures regulation and the treatment of the 9/11 detainees.85 
 81. Cf. Richard A. Serrano, Rights Ensnarled in Dragnet; Immigration Statutes 
Used to Hold Suspects Indefinitely and Detain Material Witnesses, THE SEATTLE 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001 at A6. 
 82. See Office of the Inspector General, Dep’t of Justice, THE SEPTEMBER 11 
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION 
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 
ATTACKS 21, 29 (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/ 
full.pdf [hereinafter OIG REPORT] (investigating the treatment and experiences of 
the 9/11 detainees in response to reports and allegations of detentions without 
charge, incommunicado detention, and physical abuse); Letter from Local and 
National Advocacy Groups to the Honorable Thomas J. Ridge, Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec. (Sept. 9, 2003), available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/Desktop 
Default.aspx?tabid=565 (criticizing DHS for using “profiling and immigration law 
as a ‘proxy’ for [fighting] terrorism”). 
 83. Cf. Natsu Taylor Saito, Will Force Trump Legality After September 11? 
American Jurisprudence Confronts the Rule of Law, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6-7 
(2002) (recording that media reports of individuals “disappearing” prompted civil 
liberties and human rights organizations to file a request under the Freedom of 
Information Act for information about the arrested individuals, including their 
names, locations, and the charges against them). When the Department of Justice 
denied the FOIA request, eighteen organizations filed a lawsuit demanding the 
information. Id. at 7. 
 84. See OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 30-34 (examining the reasons for the 
prolonged detention of the 9/11 detainees and the conditions of their confinement). 
The OIG report scrutinizes the actions of senior managers at the FBI, the INS, 
Border and Transportation Security Directorate, and other agencies responsible for 
instituting the policies for investigation of the 9/11 attacks. See id. at 27-29. 
 85. See id. at 1 (explaining that after 9/11 the FBI initiated an investigation 
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Among these are issues relating to racial profiling of Arabs and 
South Asians, lack of timely service of immigration charges, 
incommunicado detention, and the use of civil immigration detention 
for criminal law enforcement purposes.86
4. The Asa Hutchinson Memorandum 
On March 30, 2004, the Undersecretary for Border and 
Transportation Security, Asa Hutchinson, issued a policy 
memorandum (“Hutchinson Memorandum”) outlining “policy and 
operational” guidance in response to the recommendations and 
criticisms of the OIG Report.87 The Hutchinson Memorandum 
provides guidance for arresting officers regarding the 
implementation of the amended custody procedures regulation.88 It 
called PENTTBOM and strove to coordinate with other federal, state, and local 
law enforcement agencies). 
 86. See id. at 29 (reporting that the 9/11 detainees received notice of charges on 
average within fifteen days of arrest). The Department of Justice dismissed the 
criticism, stressing the emergency circumstances, the novelty of the issues, and the 
staggering workload of Federal employees. See id. app. K (maintaining that the 
government’s paramount responsibility after 9/11 was keeping American safe from 
terrorists). 
 87. Hutchinson Memorandum, supra note 14. Members of Congress also 
responded to the findings of the OIG Report by introducing legislation to correct 
the procedural shortcomings of the post-9/11 modifications of custody regulations. 
See Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1502, 108th Cong. § 201 (2005) 
(amending Section 236 of the INA to require that DHS serve an NTA on 
individuals in immigration custody within forty-eight hours of arrest, and bring 
that individual before a judge within 72 hours, except for those individuals 
certified under Section 236A(a)(3) of the INA). The bill imposes a requirement 
that DHS record when it serves notice upon all individuals in custody and submit a 
yearly report to the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary to demonstrate 
compliance. Id. § 201(f). 
 88. The Hutchinson Memorandum specifies that the officer make a custody and 
initial charging determination and serve a Form I-286, Notice of Custody 
Determination, on the noncitizen within 48 hours of arrest. See Hutchinson 
Memorandum, supra note 14, sec. I pt. A (instructing ICE officers to handwrite on 
the form, “[d]ate and time of the custody determination” and “[p]robable charges 
of removability,” until ICE can reformat the form). The I-286 is not the same as 
the Notice to Appear, Form I-862, by which DHS formally charges the noncitizen 
and places him in removal proceedings. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229 (2008). The 
Memorandum requires the officer to keep a copy of the I-286, notice of custody 
determination, in the alien’s file. See Hutchinson Memorandum, supra note 14, 
sec. I pt. A. If the Officer does not meet the deadline, the Memorandum instructs 
him to “note an explanation” of the delay on the I-286 file copy. Id. (implying that 
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requires DHS to serve the NTA on the detained noncitizen within 
seventy-two hours of the initial arrest.89
The Hutchinson Memorandum also affirms that if DHS invokes 
the “emergency or other extraordinary circumstance” exception, 
neither the forty-eight hour deadline for custody determination nor 
the seventy-two hour guideline for NTA service apply.90 It defines 
the terms “emergency” and “extraordinary circumstance” to include 
acts of terrorism, a compelling law enforcement need, or facts and 
circumstances particular to the individual noncitizen.91 The 
Hutchinson Memorandum does not create any enforceable legal 
right, but simply provides the definitions as internal policy guidance 
for DHS.92
II. ANALYSIS 
National security concerns do not excuse the United States from 
its obligation to guarantee the due process protections required by the 
ICCPR.93 Nonetheless, the Executive branch has repeatedly 
maintained that the terrorist attacks justify restriction of civil liberties 
the noncitizen does not see a copy of the explanation of the delay; alien files are 
not public records). 
 89. See Hutchinson Memorandum, supra note 14, sec. I pt. D (indicating 
certain flexibility to the 72-hour deadline when issues arise due to logistical 
problems, the need to obtain criminal records, or other information relating to the 
immigration charges or law enforcement needs). 
 90. See id. sec. I pts. B, D (explaining instead that officers should make a 
custody determination and charging decision “as soon as practicable”). 
 91. See id. sec. I pt. C (defining “emergency or other extraordinary 
circumstance” as: (1) “a significant infrastructure or logistical disruption,” 
including but not limited to, an act of terrorism, weather, or serious civil 
disturbance; (2) “a compelling law enforcement need, including, but not limited to, 
an immigration emergency resulting in the influx of large numbers of detained 
aliens;” or, (3) facts or circumstances related to an individual noncitizen, including, 
but not limited to, “a particularized compelling law enforcement need”). 
 92. See id. secs. III, IV (requiring an individual assessment of cases involving 
national security concerns). 
 93. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 4(1)  (allowing State parties to take measures 
derogating from their obligation under the treaty only to the “extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation”). The derogation may not involve 
discrimination based solely on race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin. 
Id.  Moreover, a state choosing to derogate from the ICCPR must immediately 
notify the State parties of the decision. Id. art. 4(3). 
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in the interest of national security.94 In particular, the former INS 
unilaterally altered its custody procedures regulation, and Congress 
has not conducted oversight to ensure that the new procedures 
provide the requisite due process protections.95
On its face, the custody procedures regulation raises some 
unsettling possibilities.96 The lack of requirement of NTA service 
means that an individual may languish for weeks or months in 
immigration detention without notice of the charges against him or 
her.97 The open-ended “extraordinary circumstances” exception 
allowing DHS to serve an NTA within a “reasonable time,” 
introduces the possibility that DHS will take advantage of the 
regulation to arbitrarily and indefinitely detain noncitizens for 
criminal law enforcement purposes.98 The ambiguities in the custody 
procedures regulation facilitate violations of the United States’ 
obligations under the ICCPR.99 Although the Hutchinson 
Memorandum clarifies some of the standards, it remains a statement 
of policy and does not impose a binding legal obligation on DHS to
 94. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant 
Rights, 16 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 419-20 (2007) (suggesting that 
after 9/11, law enforcement officials have used immigration law as a tool to arrest, 
detain, and interrogate suspected terrorists); cf. Jennifer M. Chacon, Unsecured 
Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and National Security, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1856-57 (2007) (commenting that after 9/11, ICE has used 
national security as a rhetorical tool to justify its deportation initiatives, even 
though DHS has not in practice utilized immigration law to address national 
security threats). 
 95. See Immigration Removal Procedures Implemented in the Aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 Attacks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, 
Border Security, & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 
(2005) [hereinafter Immigration Hearings] (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, 
Member, Subcomm. on Immigr., Border Sec., & Claims) (emphasizing that 
Congress must strike a balance between providing the Government with the 
resources and the authority to protect the American people and setting 
unambiguous legal standards to safeguard civil liberties). 
 96. See Letter Concerning Guidance on ICE Implementation, supra note 68, at 
3 (noting that the regulation, even after the clarifications of the policy guidelines, 
allows for indefinite detention). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d); OIG REPORT, supra note 82, pt. C. 
 99. Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 27 (providing that States parties to a 
treaty may not use domestic law as a reason for not performing treaty obligations). 
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respect the due process rights of individuals in immigration 
detention.100
A. THE AMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE REGULATION PERMITS 
INDEFINITE AND ARBITRARY DETENTION IN VIOLATION OF 
ARTICLE 9(1) 
The custody procedures regulation fails to adequately guard 
against arbitrary detention as required by Article 9(1) of the 
ICCPR.101 Although not every detention of a noncitizen pursuant to 
the regulation is arbitrary,102 the ambiguous language permits DHS 
to detain individuals for an extended period without proper 
justification under Article 9(1).103 The extended detention of the 9/11 
detainees without charges is an example of how DHS abided by the 
standards of the regulation and still detained individuals without 
affording them basic due process protection.104
The custody procedures regulation permits deprivations of liberty 
bearing signature marks of arbitrary detention.105 The regulation 
permits warrantless immigration arrests, which may be arbitrary as 
 100. See Letter Concerning Guidance on ICE Implementation, supra note 68, 
para. 1 (commending Asa Hutchinson for the policy memorandum as providing 
much needed, though not sufficient, clarification of the ambiguous language of the 
amended regulation). 
 101. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 8 (recommending that the 
INS not continue to detain an individual for an immigration violation without 
showing evidence that the individual is a danger to society or a flight risk). 
 102. Cf. A v. Australia, No. 560/1993, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 
(Apr. 30, 1997) (holding that the administrative detention of an asylum seeker is 
not per se arbitrary). 
 103. See id. ¶ 9.4 (declaring that a State should not continue to hold an 
individual in administrative detention if it cannot find an “appropriate” 
justification). 
 104. See Hugo van Alphen v. The Netherlands, No. 305/1988, ¶ 5.8, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988 (Aug. 15, 1990) (stating that a State may only use 
preventative detention when “reasonable” and “necessary” to, for example, prevent 
destruction of evidence, flight, or future crime). 
 105. See, e.g., AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND., PETITION TO THE 
U.N. WORKING GROUP ON ARBITRARY DETENTION ON BEHALF OF CERTAIN 
IMMIGRANTS DETAINED BY THE UNITED STATES IN CONNECTION WITH THE EVENTS 
OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 at 8-10 (2004) (alleging Category III arbitrary detention 
because the U.S. government failed to promptly notify the thirteen complainants of 
the charges against them and failed to bring them promptly before a judicial 
authority). 
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the lack of an arrest warrant introduces the possibility that DHS 
might not have sufficient evidence to justify the deprivation of 
liberty.106 Warrantless immigration arrests in particular carry the risk 
that immigration officers may arbitrarily or wrongly arrest an 
individual because the INA authorizes them to make the arrest based 
only on a “reasonable suspicion” that the individual is present in the 
United States in violation of immigration laws.107
Moreover, a lawful and non-arbitrary detention may become 
arbitrary with the passage of time.108 Therefore, a lawful and non-
arbitrary detention of an individual based on a reasonable suspicion 
may become arbitrary if an unreasonable amount of time lapses 
before DHS issues and serves the NTA.109 For example, the 
detention for weeks and sometimes months of many of the 9/11 
detainees pursuant to the custody procedures regulation fits the 
definition of arbitrary because the government failed to justify those 
detentions by issuing an NTA with specific charges of removability 
or by filing criminal charges. 
The Hutchinson Memorandum’s policy guidance in response to 
the issues highlighted in the OIG Report does not adequately protect 
 106. Cf. INS Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001). 
 107. See, e.g., Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and Removal 
Procedures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Border Sec., & Int’l L. of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3, at 8 (2008) [hereinafter Hearings 
2008] (Written Testimony, Kara Hartzler, Esq., Florence Immigrant and Refugee 
Rights Project), available at http://www.bc.edu/centers/humanrights/meta-
elements/pdf/Kara_Hartzler_-_written_testimony.pdf (recounting examples of the 
erroneous detention of citizens and individuals who are not deportable to 
demonstrate the prevalence of racial profiling, inefficiency, and injustice in ICE 
detention and removal procedures). In Virginia, recent implementation of 
agreements, pursuant to Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
allow local law enforcement officials to enforce immigration laws increasing the 
risk of the wrongful detention of legal permanent residents or citizens because non-
immigration officials are less familiar with complex immigration laws and legal 
standards. See Interview with Brittney Nystrom, supra note 2. 
 108. Cf. A v. Australia, No. 560/1993, ¶ 9.4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 
(Apr. 30, 1997) (proposing that detention decisions be reviewed periodically to 
ensure continuing justification for detaining an individual). 
 109. Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 51-52 (listing several 
examples of individuals who waited extended periods for charging documents in 
immigration detention after 9/11). For example, the INS arrested Pakistani Afzal 
Kham on September 17, 2001 and by February 6, 2002, had not served him with a 
charging document or brought him before a judge. Id. at 52. 
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against potentially arbitrary detentions permitted by the regulation.110 
Immigration officials still have immense discretion to conduct 
warrantless arrests.111 The low “reasonable suspicion” standard 
facilitates racial profiling.112 It also increases the likelihood that 
officials will mistakenly arrest U.S. citizens or individuals with 
lawful immigration status who do not have the proper 
documentation.113 The malleable standards of the amended 
regulation114 and the broad and non-binding guidelines of the 
Hutchinson Memorandum do not provide sufficient protection for 
individuals who have been arrested erroneously.115 The concern that 
the custody procedures regulation leads to arbitrary detention is 
further compounded by its inconsistency with both Article 9(2) and 
Article 9(4) of the ICCPR.116
 110. See Hutchinson Memorandum, supra note 14, intro. (implementing policy 
and operational changes, but not imposing any new legal obligations on DHS). But 
see Immigration Hearings, supra note 95, at 28 (Testimony of Joseph Greene, Dir. 
of Training and Development, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Dept. 
of Homeland Security) (maintaining that the Hutchinson Memorandum guarantees 
that DHS promptly notifies noncitizens in immigration detention of the charges 
against them). 
 111. See Chacon, supra note 94, at 1871-72 (suggesting that the broad discretion 
to arrest and the decreased procedural protections promotes racial profiling by 
immigration enforcement agents). 
 112. See, e.g., See Asli Ü. Bâli, Scapegoating the Vulnerable: Preventive 
Detention of Immigrants in America’s “War on Terror”, 38 STUD. IN L. POL. & 
SOC’Y 25, 25-26 (maintaining that the detention of Middle Eastern and South 
Asians on minor immigration charges has, in effect, become a “system of 
preventive detention”). 
 113. See, e.g., Hearings 2008, supra note 107, at 3 (detailing the story of 
Thomas Warziniak, who worked in the kitchen of a jail for one dollar a day to earn 
enough money to buy a replacement birth certificate to prove his citizenship). ICE 
reportedly detained Mr. Warziniak for deportation because of his “foreign-
sounding name.” Id. 
 114. Cf. Huey et al., supra note 13, at 400 (pointing out that the open-ended 
“extraordinary circumstances” exception permits prolonged and indefinite 
detention while the implementing statute only permits necessary and unavoidable 
delays). 
 115. See Letter Concerning Guidance on ICE Implementation, supra note 68, 
para. 3 (contending that the “compelling law enforcement need” standard set forth 
by the Hutchinson Memorandum, although a step in the right direction, is still 
inconsistent with the Constitution and implementing legislation). 
 116. Cf. Working Group Fact Sheet, supra note 33, sec. IV pt. B (defining 
Category III arbitrary detention as when the state fails to observe international 
norms such as those set forth in Article 9 of the ICCPR). 
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B. THE REGULATION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE “PROMPTLY 
INFORM” STANDARD OF ARTICLE 9(2) OF THE ICCPR 
DHS’s ambiguous custody regulation fails to meet the Article 9(2) 
“prompt notice” standard because the regulation does not require 
service of the NTA on the detained individual and the open-ended 
exceptions permit potentially indefinite delays.117 While the 
Committee has found that the “prompt notice” requirement of Article 
9(2) applies only to criminal detention, the Working Group considers 
it to apply to all deprivations of liberty.118 Clarifying the distinction 
between criminal and civil deprivations of liberty is important 
because U.S. law regards immigration violations as civil and the 
subsequent detention as administrative and non-punitive.119 In order 
to proceed with the Article 9(2) analysis, this comment maintains 
that the “prompt notice” standard set by Article 9(2) applies to U.S. 
immigration detention either because the standard applies to all 
deprivations of liberty120 or because the U.S. government has 
expressed a willingness to use the custody procedures regulation to 
detain individuals for criminal law enforcement purposes in certain 
circumstances.121
 117. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 3 (criticizing that by July 
2002, the U.S. Government had not charged one of the over 700 9/11 detainees 
with a terrorism related offense, in spite of the widespread due process abuses 
evident in their arrests and detention). 
 118. See Working Group Principles, supra note 52, annex I. pt. A (considering 
that the notice requirement is equally applicable to administrative and judicial 
detention). 
 119. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
conditions in non-punitive immigration detention must be better than conditions of 
confinement for convicted prisoners and pre-trial criminal detainees). 
 120. See generally Working Group Principles, supra note 52, at sec. IV(A) 
(maintaining that both criminal and administrative detention constitute 
“deprivation of freedom” for the purposes of the Working Group). 
 121. See, e.g., Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001) 
(expressing, for example, that the additional time pursuant to the custody 
procedures regulation gives immigration officials time to coordinate with other law 
enforcement officials). 
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1. The “Prompt Notice” Requirement of Article 9(2) Applies to 
Immigration Detention Insofar as it Allows DHS to Detain 
Individuals for Criminal Law Enforcement Purposes 
While Article 9(1) and Article 9(4) of the ICCPR indisputably 
apply to all deprivations of liberty, regardless of label, the status of 
Article 9(2) is more uncertain. The Committee maintains that only 
the first part of Article 9(2) applies to non-criminal arrests, namely 
the requirement that officials inform the individual of the reasons for 
his or her arrest.122  The Working Group, however, maintains that the 
“prompt notice” requirement applies to all deprivations of liberty, 
including administrative immigration detention.123
The language of Article 9(2) is ambiguous; the text of the 
provision does not specify whether it applies to criminal or non-
criminal arrests.124 In contrast, Article 9(3) of the ICCPR specifically 
guarantees certain rights for pretrial criminal detainees.125 Examining 
the plain meaning of the text,126 Article 9(3) explicitly specifies 
criminal, while Article 9(2) and 9(4) are similarly silent. This 
distinction implies that both Articles 9(2) and 9(4) apply to all 
deprivations of liberty, while Article 9(3) applies only to pre-trial 
criminal detention.127 Contrary to the Committee’s interpretation, the 
Working Group’s view and the plain statutory language demonstrate 
that the “prompt notice” requirement of Article 9(2) should apply to 
all deprivations of liberty. 
Assuming arguendo that the “prompt notice” requirement of 
Article 9(2) applies only to criminal detention, U.S. immigration 
detention should qualify as criminal for Article 9 purposes.128 
 122. See BOELES, supra note 51, at 117. 
 123. See Working Group Principles, supra note 52, annex 1 pt. A(3). 
 124. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(2) (mentioning generally arrest and detention). 
States should resolve such a textual ambiguity in light of the “object and purpose” 
of the treaty. Vienna Convention, supra note 3, art. 31(1). 
 125. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(3) (specifying requirements for pretrial 
criminal detention). 
 126. See Vienna Convention, supra note 6, art. 31(1) (expressing a preference 
for the textual interpretation of international agreements). 
 127. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 9(2)-(4). 
 128. Cf. Portorreal v. Dominican Republic, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 188/1984,  
¶ 2.3, U.N. Doc. 40 (A/43/40) (1988) (finding that arbitrary arrest existed in a case 
where government detained an individual for fifty hours without informing him of 
the reasons for his arrest and without ultimately charging him with a criminal 
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Although immigration detention is purportedly non-criminal,129 the 
U.S. Government demonstrates both the intention and willingness to 
use “civil” immigration provisions for criminal law enforcement 
purposes.130 The government may use the period between arrest and 
charging to investigate both immigration and criminal offenses.131 
The prompt notice requirement of Article 9(2) applies to U.S. 
immigration custody procedures either because it pertains to all 
deprivations of liberty regardless of label132 or because the United 
States is willing to use immigration detention for criminal law 
enforcement purposes.133
2. The Regulation Does Not Impose an Obligation on DHS to Serve 
an NTA on the Noncitizen as Required by Article 9(2) 
The ambiguous language of DHS’s custody procedures regulation 
is inconsistent with the prompt notice requirement of Article 9(2).134  
Under Article 9(2), the United States must ensure that DHS provide 
offense); Van Duzen v. Canada, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. R.12/50, ¶ 10.2, U.N. Doc. 
Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) (1982) (noting that the definition of the terms and concepts 
of the Covenant are separate from any definition that may already exist in the 
national legal system). 
 129. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (opining that if 
Congress wishes to make an immigration violation a criminal offense it must 
provide for a judicial trial to establish guilt). 
 130. See, e.g., OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 37-69 (detailing the serious 
problems with the extended detention of noncitizens arrested in response to 9/11 
and the law enforcement motivation for the delay); Hutchinson Memorandum, 
supra note 14, sec. I pt. C (allowing the government to detain individuals under 
general immigration laws beyond the forty-eight-hour limit in the event of “a 
particularized compelling law enforcement need”). 
 131. See Wadhia, supra note 94, at 419-20 (discussing how post-9/11, DHS used 
general immigration detention provisions to detain terrorism suspects during 
investigations and criminal background checks). 
 132. See Working Group Principles, supra note 52, annex I pt. A(3) (noting that 
principles 10, 13, and 14 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment protect similar rights as 
Art. 9(2) of the ICCPR). 
 133. See, e.g., Bâli, supra note 112, at 26 (quoting Attorney General John 
Ashcroft stating that the government will use whatever available pretext to detain 
individuals suspected of connections with terrorism). 
 134. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 49 (commenting that the 
custody procedures regulation did not require that INS provide a justification for 
its invocation of the exception to the forty-eight-hour rule, nor did it require that 
INS notify the individual or the Immigration Court of the decision). 
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notice of charges promptly, before or during the first interrogation.135  
Although the custody procedures regulation requires that DHS 
decide whether to charge the immigrant within forty-eight hours of 
arrest, it establishes no timeframe within which DHS must actually 
issue the NTA and serve it on the alien.136 There is no requirement 
that DHS record or report when the officer made the charging 
determination in relation to the initial arrest or when the officer 
served the NTA on the detained individual.137 The regulation does 
not specify any remedy for a violation of the “forty-eight-hour” 
rule.138 These ambiguities raise doubts as to whether the regulation 
effectively assures prompt notice of charges to immigration detainees 
in accordance with Article 9(2) of the ICCPR.139
The policy directive of the Hutchinson memorandum that DHS 
serve the NTA within seventy-two hours of arrest does not dispel 
these doubts.140 The Hutchinson Memorandum fails to impose a 
binding legal obligation on DHS to serve the NTA within seventy-
two hours.141 In fact, DHS concedes that logistical difficulties and 
law enforcement needs might render timely issuance and service of 
the NTA impracticable.142 If DHS fails to serve the NTA within the 
 135. See Hill v. Spain, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 526/1993, ¶ 12.2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/59/D/526/1993 (1997) (finding that a delay of up to eight hours is 
permissible under Article 9(2)); Grant v. Jamaica, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 
597/1994, ¶ 8.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/597/1994 (1996) (ruling that a delay of 
seven days violates Article 9(2)); Griffin v. Spain, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 
493/1992, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/493/1992 (1995) (accepting that a delay 
of several hours does not violate Article 9(2)). 
 136. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2008). 
 137. See id. 
 138. Cf. H.R. 1502, 109th Cong. § 201(f) (2005) (mandating that DHS bring a 
noncitizen before an Immigration Judge within seventy-two hours in any case in 
which DHS has not served the NTA on the noncitizen within forty-eight hours of 
arrest). 
 139. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 2 (requiring states to ensure all rights 
enumerated in the ICCPR and provide an effective remedy in case of a violation). 
 140. See Letter Concerning Guidance on ICE Implementation, supra note 68, 
para. 1. 
 141. See Hutchinson Memorandum, supra note 14, sec. IV. 
 142. See, e.g., Immigration Hearings, supra note 93, at 48-51 (Prepared 
Statement of William D. West, Retired Supervisory Special Agent, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
Immigration & Customs Enforcement) (describing the logistical challenges faced 
by immigration officers while making a charging determination, including 
cumbersome searches through paper files and multiple databases); cf. HUMAN 
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seventy-two hour deadline, the detained individual detainee has no 
legal remedy as Article 9(2) requires.143 From an oversight 
perspective, it is also impossible to ascertain whether DHS promptly 
charges immigrant detainees or informs them of the charges against 
them because neither the regulation nor the Memorandum impose a 
reporting requirement on DHS.144 Lack of timely service of the NTA 
frustrates the notice requirement’s purpose of “. . . allow[ing] [the 
arrested individual] to take immediate steps to secure his release if he 
believes that the reasons given are invalid or unfounded.”145 
Immigration detainees cannot adequately assess the legality of their 
detention without knowing the charges against them.146 The lack of a 
binding legal obligation to serve the NTA within a certain period of 
time coupled with the lack of a reporting requirement indicates a 
failure to ensure timely service of the NTA as required by Article 
9(2) of the ICCPR.147
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 49 (considering the risk that the government 
may hold individuals who are not guilty of immigration violations indefinitely 
without charges due to the INS’s own inefficiency and difficulty in coordinating 
with other government agencies). 
 143. Cf. Hutchinson Memorandum, supra note 14, sec. IV (“[This 
Memorandum] does not, is not intended to, shall not be construed to, and may not 
be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by 
any person in any matter, civil or criminal”). 
 144. See OIG REPORT, supra note 82, at 28 (noting that “INS does not record the 
date or time the charging determination is made”). No inquiry since the OIG report 
has produced statistics indicating when or if individuals in immigration detention 
receive NTAs. See Interview with Brittney Nystrom, supra note 2 (noting that, 
although the problem of delayed NTAs is pervasive in Virginia immigration 
detention centers, immigration detention is so complex and lacking in transparency 
that it is often difficult for advocates to ascertain where a person is in the process 
or whether DHS has in fact issued an NTA). 
 145. See Drescher v. Uruguay, Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 43/1979, ¶ 13.2, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/19/D/43/1979 (July 21, 1983) (holding that Navy officials violated 
ICCPR article 9(2) by failing to explain to a detainee the charges against him). 
 146. See id. ¶ 13.2 (holding that insufficient notice of reasons for arrest and 
charges impedes the ability of the detained individual to challenge the legality of 
the detention and violates Article 9(2)). 
 147. Cf. Hutchinson Memorandum, supra note 14, sec. IV (warning that the 
Memorandum is not binding since it constitutes “internal guidance” and creates no 
“enforceable” rights). 
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3. The Regulation Provides No Guidance as to the Meaning of 
“Extraordinary Circumstances” and “Reasonable Period of Time” 
The sweeping exception to the charging requirement in the event 
of an “emergency or other extraordinary circumstance” gives rise to 
further doubts that the custody procedures regulation complies with 
Article 9(2) of the ICCPR.148 Preventive detention of suspected 
terrorists is particularly problematic because the regulation provides 
no guidance as to the meaning of “extraordinary circumstances” and 
“reasonable period of time.”149 While the Hutchinson Memorandum 
provides a more specific definition of “extraordinary 
circumstances,”150 its non-binding policies do not satisfy the 
requirement to ensure the right to prompt notice of charges under 
Article 9(2) of the ICCPR.151
The definition it provides gives leeway to the government to take 
advantage of the exception after a terrorist attack, much as it did after 
9/11.152 Although the Hutchinson Memorandum mandates that only 
certain officials may determine what qualifies as an extraordinary 
circumstance, it reaffirms the notion that the government may use the 
exception to conduct criminal investigations.153 It also clarifies that 
the government may determine on a case-by-case basis whether to
 148. Cf. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2008). 
 149. See id.; see also NOWAK, supra note 16, at 226 (reporting the finding of 
U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention that “in the absence of US derogation 
in accordance with Article 4 of the CCPR, . . . the preventive detention of 
suspected terrorists for a prolonged period of time without any criminal charge and 
judicial review . . . confers an arbitrary character on the detention”). 
 150. See Hutchinson Memorandum, supra note 14, sec. I pts. B-C. (providing 
that a Special Agent in Charge, a Border Protection Chief, or a Field Office 
Director must determine whether there is a “compelling law enforcement need” 
necessitating the invocation of the exception to the forty-eight-hour rule). 
 151. Cf. Uzbekistan Report, supra note 49, ¶ 79(12) (stating that the state should 
comply with Article 9(2) of the ICCPR by reducing the amount of time before the 
government informs criminal detainees of the charges against them). 
 152. See, e.g., OIG Report, supra note 82, at 62-64 (chronicling the delayed 
processing of incorrectly categorized “special interest” detainees in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks). 
 153. See, e.g., Hutchinson Memorandum, supra note 14, sec. I pt. C (affirming 
that ICE may invoke the extraordinary circumstances due to a “particularized 
compelling law enforcement need”). 
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invoke the exception, without notifying the detained individual of the 
reasons justifying the decision.154
Furthermore, the Hutchinson Memorandum fails to bring the 
custody procedures regulation into conformity with Article 9(2) 
because it does not legally bind DHS to comply with the policy 
guidance.155  It does not impose a reporting requirement on DHS, 
making it impossible to ascertain whether DHS complies with the 
policy directive.156 An individual detained without charges pursuant 
to the “extraordinary circumstances” exception would not be able to 
rely on the Hutchinson Memorandum to provide a remedy for a 
detention that violates Article 9(2) of the ICCPR.157 The definition of 
“extraordinary circumstances” and other guidelines provided by the 
Hutchinson Memorandum are far too vague and open-ended to 
ensure that the Executive does not violate Article 9(2) by using the 
regulation to detain individuals for prolonged periods without 
charges.158
C. THE REGULATION IMPEDES PROMPT REVIEW OF DETENTION 
FOLLOWING ARREST IN VIOLATION OF THE “WITHOUT DELAY” 
STANDARD OF ARTICLE 9(4) OF THE ICCPR 
Article 9(4) obligates the United States to allow immigration 
detainees access to a judge to review the legality of their detention 
“without delay.”159 Indeed, the Article 9(4) protections “exist 
 154. See id. sec. I pt. B (stating that when ICE invokes the exception, the officer 
must place a memorandum or “other documentation” explaining the specific 
reasons for doing so in the noncitizen’s file). 
 155. See id. sec. IV (denying detainees any enforceable remedy against the state 
for violations of the Memorandum’s policy guidance). 
 156. See, e.g., OIG Report, supra note 82, at 29-30 (providing the only known 
source of statistics on the 9/11 detainees that is available to the public). 
 157. Cf. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 2 (requiring the state to provide effective 
remedies for rights violations). 
 158. See Hutchison Memorandum, supra note 14, sec. I pt. C (providing that 
once ICE invokes the exception, the ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor 
must review the decision in thirty days to determine “whether factors leading to 
such a determination continue to exist”). 
 159. See Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment 29/72, ¶ 16,  U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.ll (2001) [hereinafter Gen. Comment 29/72] (explaining 
that Article 9(4) is not derogable because states must respect the fundamental 
requirements of a fair trial during an emergency); see also NOWAK, supra note 16, 
at 218 (observing that the first draft of Article 9 provided “the right to an effective 
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regardless of whether deprivation of liberty is unlawful.”160 
Therefore, the Article 9(4) requirement applies to immigration 
detention, whether it is “administrative” or “civil.”161 The 
extraordinary circumstances exception does not excuse the U.S. 
government of its obligation to ensure the right of an individual to 
judicial review of detention. Derogation from the other Article 9 
obligations because of a war or emergency does not allow derogation 
from the Article 9(4) habeas right to have the lawfulness of detention 
reviewed by a competent court.162
Individuals detained pursuant to immigration regulations have the 
right to petition for habeas relief in Federal Court and file a motion 
for bond in immigration court.163 In practice, however, noncitizens 
are often unable to access an immigration court for a bond or other 
type of hearing until DHS has served the NTA on the immigration 
court.164 Moreover, it is difficult for a detained individual to 
challenge the lawfulness of detention without knowledge of the 
charges against them.165
remedy in the nature of habeas corpus” but noting that the parties ultimately used 
an open-ended requirement so that states could formulate proceedings within their 
own legal systems). 
 160. NOWAK, supra note 16, at 235. Immigration falls squarely within the 
reasons for which States may deprive a person of liberty besides criminal 
punishment; others include pretrial detention and mental illness. See id. at 216. 
 161. See Moldova Report, supra note 55, ¶ 84(11) (noting that article 9(4) 
applies to administrative detention). 
 162. See Gen. Comment 29/72, supra note 161, ¶¶ 3, 11 (explaining that not all 
disturbances or emergencies are cause for derogation, but only those that “threaten 
the life of the nation”). 
 163. See Interview with Brittney Nystrom, supra note 4 (noting that a federal 
habeas petition is not an effective remedy in the case of a delayed NTA and that 
advocates consequently file a bond motion in the immigration court to bring a case 
to the attention of DHS and hopefully trigger the issuance of the NTA).  When 
DHS has issued an I-200, Warrant to Arrest, a federal court will dismiss a habeas 
petition because the Immigration Court is the proper forum for review.  Id.  
Moreover, the detention is ostensibly lawful—no law or regulation requires that 
DHS issue an NTA in order to detain the noncitizen; the statute only requires that 
DHS determine whether it will issue the NTA.  Id. 
 164. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 53 (arguing that the recourse 
to habeas corpus is not sufficient because most immigration detainees are 
unrepresented and unfamiliar with the U.S. legal system). 
 165. See id. at 52-53 (noting that INS does not schedule hearings for detained 
noncitizens for individualized determinations of probable cause). 
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The regulation does not provide any guidance as to when DHS 
must serve the NTA on the Immigration Court, an action that 
initiates judicial proceedings and formally provides the detained 
individual access to a judge.166 Under Article 9(4), the state must 
decide on a case-by-case basis the time limit within which 
individuals may challenge the legality of their detention.167 If DHS 
has not served the NTA on the Immigration Court, the detained 
immigrant may not have access to any judicial review for weeks or 
months, a situation that clearly violates Article 9(4).168
Article 9(4) requires that the judicial officer order release if the 
detention is unlawful under domestic or international law.169 
Immigration Judges, however, may not have discretion to order the 
release of the individual if he or she is subject to mandatory 
detention.170 Those individuals subject to mandatory detention 
should still be entitled to receive prompt notice of charges against 
them. The delayed service of the NTA pursuant to the custody 
procedures regulation and the lack of a requirement of service of the 
NTA on the Immigration Court impede judicial review of detention 
“without delay” for immigration detainees.171
 166. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2008); see also Interview with Megan Mack, 
American Bar Association Commission on Immigration (Dec. 4, 2007) (on file 
with author) (explaining that practitioners often complain that they cannot 
advocate effectively when their clients have to wait weeks for DHS to serve 
Executive Office for Immigration Review with the NTA). 
 167. Cf. Torres v. Finland, Human Rights Comm., No. 291/1988, ¶¶ 8-9, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/291/1988 (Apr. 5, 1990) (finding that the Aliens Act of 
Finland did not allow review of the detention by a court without delay, in violation 
of Article 9(4) of the ICCPR). 
 168. Cf. Kelly v. Jamaica, Human Rights Comm., No. 253/1987, ¶ 5.6, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 (Apr. 10, 1991) (noting that inability of the detained 
to access a lawyer or communicate with family members exacerbated the Article 
9(4) violation). 
 169. See NOWAK, supra note 16, at 236 (suggesting that “mandatory detention” 
of immigrants and asylum seekers is irreconcilable with the right to petition for 
relief based on the underlying illegality of the detention). 
 170. See Interview with Brittney Nystrom, supra note 2 (stating that filing a 
motion for bond in Immigration Court, to trigger the issuance of an NTA, is 
particularly disingenuous from an ethical perspective if the advocate knows that 
the client is subject to mandatory detention and thus is not eligible for bond). 
 171. See Baban v. Australia, Human Rights Comm., No. 1014/2001, ¶ 7.2, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001 (Sept. 18, 2003) (stressing that reviewing officers 
must order release if the detention is incompatible with the requirements of the 
Covenant, especially those of article 9(1)).  It is important that the “[j]udicial 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to comply with basic international standards of due 
process and guard against violations of Article 9 of the ICCPR, DHS 
should amend the ambiguous language of the regulation.172 This 
comment enumerates five changes that promote compliance with 
Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
A. DHS SHOULD AMEND THE REGULATION TO REQUIRE SERVICE 
OF THE NTA ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE IMMIGRATION COURT 
WITHIN FORTY-EIGHT HOURS OF ARREST 
Currently, the regulation only requires that DHS make “a charging 
determination” within the forty-eight-hour period.173 The regulation 
should require that DHS both issue and serve the NTA on the 
detainee within forty-eight hours of arrest. This change to a forty-
eight hour requirement would ensure that custody procedures 
comport with the “prompt notice” standard of the ICCPR.174
The regulation should also require that DHS serve the NTA on the 
Immigration Court within forty-eight hours of the arrest. A 
requirement of service on the Immigration Court would ensure that 
the alien has access to judicial review promptly after service of the 
NTA in accordance with Article 9(4) of the ICCPR, which gives 
individuals the right to judicial review of the detention “without 
delay.”175 This revision prevents immigrants from languishing in 
detention for weeks or months awaiting consideration of a bond 
motion or the scheduling of a court date because DHS has not served 
the NTA on the Immigration Court.176
review of the lawfulness of detention under [Article 9(4)]” not only consider 
whether the detention conforms to domestic law standards of habeas corpus but 
also test whether the detention violates other obligations of the ICCPR. Id. 
 172. See Letter Concerning Guidance on ICE Implementation, supra note 66, 
para. 7 (stressing that any revisions should incorporate “firm requirement[s]”). 
 173. 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) (2008). 
 174. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 9(2); see, e.g., Uzbekistan Report, supra note 49, 
¶ 79(12) (expressing concern that detention for seventy-two hours without notice 
of charges violates article 9(2) of the ICCPR in the criminal context). 
 175. Cf. Switzerland Report, supra note 54, at ¶¶ 100, 111 (stating that a 
detention time limit of ninety-six hours is too long). 
 176. See Letter Concerning Guidance on ICE Implementation, supra note 66, 
para. 6 (noting that failure to serve the NTA on the Immigration Court can prevent 
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B. DHS SHOULD AMEND THE REGULATION TO INCLUDE AN 
UNAMBIGUOUS DEFINITION OF “EXTRAORDINARY 
CIRCUMSTANCES” AND “REASONABLE TIME” 
Given legitimate national security concerns, the “extraordinary 
circumstances” exception written in response to the September 11 
attack could be maintained.177 DHS should, however, clarify the 
language. The regulation should provide a more specific definition of 
“extraordinary circumstance,” for example stating that the term 
indicates a war or a large-scale attack on the territorial United States. 
The regulation should also indicate that the custody procedures of the 
Patriot Act apply to all suspected terrorists.178 The “reasonable time” 
limit is too open-ended and should be amended as well.179 The 
regulation should state: “a reasonable time, not to exceed one week.” 
The seven day limit makes sense because it matches the requirements 
of the Patriot Act.180 The consistency ensures that the government 
will not use administrative immigration detention for criminal law 
enforcement purposes to take advantage of the “reasonable period of 
time” exception to detain individuals while law enforcement officials 
counsel and family members from being able to locate the detainee within the 
detention system). 
 177. See INS Custody Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,334, 48,334 (Sept. 20, 2001) 
(justifying change to regulation by describing the legitimate law enforcement and 
national security concerns that might arise during the detention and removal 
process). 
 178. See Hutchinson Memorandum, supra note 13, sec. I pt. C (defining an 
extraordinary circumstance broadly as any situation giving rise to a “compelling 
law enforcement need”). 
 179. Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 49 (noting that the 
government used the “reasonable time” limit to justify holding the 9/11 detainees 
without the procedural protections afforded pre-trial criminal detainees). 
 180. See Mehta, supra note 12, at 37 (noting inconsistency between the Patriot 
Act, which requires the government to serve notice of detainees within seven days, 
and DHS, which has discretion to serve notice on regular immigration detainees 
within a “reasonable” period of time). But see Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous By 
Decree: Detention Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 LOY. L. REV. 
149, 170 (2004) (concluding that the seven-day deadline of the Patriot Act was 
irrelevant to the detention of noncitizens post-9/11 because the government found 
it easier to detain individuals suspected of terrorism pursuant to general detention 
provisions in immigration law, which allow for detention without bond in normal 
immigration proceedings); cf. David Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits 
on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 1027 (2002) (arguing that the 
seven-day detention limit of the Patriot Act violates the 4th Amendment of the 
Constitution). 
  
606 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [24:571 
 
gather additional evidence.181 In the wake of a national emergency, 
the seven-day limit might also lessen criticism that the United States 
engages in racial profiling and commits egregious due process 
violations. This could prevent protests echoing those that took place 
when the government, pursuant to the amended regulation, held the 
9/11 detainees in custody without charges.182
C. DHS SHOULD ADD A PROVISION SPECIFYING THAT IN THE 
EVENT OF A DETENTION EXCEEDING FORTY-EIGHT HOURS 
WITHOUT SERVICE OF THE NTA, THE INDIVIDUAL SHALL HAVE 
THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE IMMIGRATION JUDGE FOR RELEASE 
The regulation should add the following language: “in the event of 
a time period exceeding forty-eight hours, the alien shall have the 
right to petition an Immigration Judge for and be granted release on 
his own recognizance, unless ICE can demonstrate that he is a flight 
risk or a threat.” Such a provision would ensure that immigration 
detainees have both the right to judicial review and release required 
by Article 9(4) of the ICCPR.183 Moreover, a provision creating an 
explicit right for an immigrant to petition for release would give 
DHS an incentive to streamline the immigration detention process.184
D. DHS SHOULD AMEND THE REGULATION TO IMPOSE A 
REPORTING REQUIREMENT ON DHS TO FACILITATE OVERSIGHT 
The regulation should impose a reporting requirement on DHS 
because it is currently impossible to ascertain whether DHS 
comports with its own forty-eight-hour deadline.185 The regulation 
 181. See Huey et al., supra note 12, at 399-401 (commenting that, under the 
authorizing statute, the government would have to meet the probable cause 
standard in order to detain a suspected individual while gathering evidence in a 
criminal case). 
 182. Cf. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 13, at 4 (alluding to the detention 
of non-citizens after 9/11 on the basis of national origin, ethnicity, gender, and 
religion). 
 183. See ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 9(4). 
 184. Cf. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Dep’t of Homeland Security, 
Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2007, Feb. 5, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/pi/news/factsheets/2007budgetfactsheet.pdf (demonstrating that ICE 
allocated $1,381,767 to custody operations in fiscal year 2007, creating potential 
savings for the American taxpayer if such operations were streamlined). 
 185. Cf. Civil Liberties Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 4591, 108th Cong. 
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should require that DHS record and report the period of time 
between the initial arrest, the charging determination, and service of 
the NTA on the immigrant and on the Immigration Court.186 This 
change would both incentivize respect for the due process rights of 
immigrants in detention and facilitate effective government 
oversight.187
CONCLUSION 
The unilateral amendment of DHS’s custody procedures 
regulation reflects post-9/11 national security panic rather than a 
reasoned effort to improve the efficiency and fairness of immigration 
detention procedures. The custody procedures regulation permits 
arbitrary and indefinite detention in violation of international 
standards of due process enshrined in Article 9 of the ICCPR. With 
the benefit of hindsight, this comment urges DHS and Congress to 
take action to bring the U.S. immigration detention custody 
procedures into compliance with Article 9 of the ICCPR. 
 
 
§ 201(f)(2) (2004) (proposing a requirement on DHS to provide yearly reports to 
Congress about compliance with the notice requirement). 
 186. See Letter Concerning Guidance on ICE Implementation, supra note 66, 
paras. 5-6 (affirming that concerns about DHS compliance with the regulation are 
broader than just service of notice, including service of the NTA on the 
Immigration Court). 
 187. See Immigration Hearings, supra note 93, at 3 (statement of Rep. Howard 
L. Berman) (alluding to Congress’s responsibility to exercise its oversight of 
administrative agencies). 
